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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence, following a jury trial, for
second-degree stalking, a misdemeanor. I.C. § 18-7906(1) and (3). The judgment was affirmed
on appeal to the district court. R 59. Appellant Desiree Eliasen asks this Court to vacate the
judgment of conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient
as a matter of law to show she engaged in repeated acts of nonconsensual conduct involving the
complaining witness, a material element of the offense. I.C. § 18-7906(1)(a).
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts

1. Pretrial proceedings
Ms. Eliasen was charged by citation with one count of Second-Degree Stalking in
violation ofI.C. § 18-7906. R 96. She entered a plea of not guilty. R 105.
On December 12, 2008, Ms. Eliasen filed a motion to dismiss the case for insufficient
evidence. R 113. At the hearing on the motion, she argued that the evidence showed that there
was not a course of conduct as she was accused of following Lynette Sampson on one continuous
occasion on September 26, 2008. T pg. 30, ln. 2-8. The magistrate court, the Honorable Rick
Camaroli presiding, denied the motion noting that "[t]he way the police report reads the
argument could be made that there are two acts of following, one from home to Good Will [sic]
and the other from Good Will [sic] to the police department[.]" Id., In. 19-25; R 124.
On February 11, 2009, the state filed a Compliant which alleged, that:
On or about 26 September 2008, in the City of Pocatello, State of Idaho, the
Defendant, DESIREE ELAISEN, knowingly and maliciously engaged in a course
of conduct that seriously annoyed, alarmed or harassed Lynette Sampson causing
1

her to suffer substantial emotional distress by following and/or maintaining
surveillance upon Lynette Sampson.
R 160.

On February 27, 2009, Ms. Eliasen filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss. R 172. The
magistrate court denied Ms. Eliasen's Renewed Motion to Dismiss and her Motion for
Permission to Appeal the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. T pg. 39, ln. 10-25.
2. Trial proceedings
Lynette Sampson lives at 454 Wyldwood Lane in Pocatello. She is married to Pocatello
Police Officer Richard Sampson and they have two young children. T pg. 176, ln. 10-20. On
Friday, September 26, 2008, she was planning to go to the Goodwill Store to make a donation
and then go to Fred Meyers to shop. T pg. 177, In. 4-5. At about 12:45 p.m., she and her threeyear-old daughter left the house. Id, ln. 8 -12. As she was backing out of the garage and
driveway, she noticed a brown Blazer stopped in the roadway facing east. T pg. 178, ln. 22-25.
She waited a few seconds for the Blazer to move. When it didn't move, she backed onto the road
and drove west. T pg. 179, ln. 1-2. The Blazer headed east, did a U-tum and then headed west.
T pg. 180, ln. 1-3. Ms. Sampson drove a block and one-half east on Wyldwood, turned south on
Meadowbrook, traveled a short block, then turned right onto E. Alameda heading west toward
Yellowstone Ave. She did not notice where the Blazer was at this point. Id., ln. 9-24.
Alameda and Yellowstone are both major arterials in Pocatello. Ms. Sampson drove west
on Alameda for three blocks and stopped for a red light at Yellowstone. She was in the left turn
lane and the Blazer was right behind her. T pg. 181, In. 5-18.
Ms. Sampson then turned left and drove to the Goodwill Store at 441 Yellowstone Ave,
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about one-half of a mile from the intersection. She did not notice the Blazer behind her. T pg.
181, ln. 5-13. When she pulled into the Goodwill, she noticed the Blazer "turned sharply" into
the parking lot and then park. Ms. Sampson got out of her car, got some bags out of the trunk,
and started walking to the donation door. A Goodwill employee came out to help her with the
donations and she stood by the door while the employee took the bags inside. While she was
waiting, she saw the Blazer. T pg. 182, ln. 5 - pg. 183, ln. 4. Ms. Sampson identified Ms. Eliasen
as the driver of the Blazer. T pg. 183, In. 18 - pg. 184, ln. 2. At that time she did not know Ms.
Eliasen. T pg. 176, In. 25 - pg. 177, ln. 1. Ms. Sampson left the Goodwill the back way, and
turned right on Pine St. This route is safer than taking a left onto Yellowstone because there is a
traffic signal at Pine. The Blazer was right behind her at the red light at Pine and Yellowstone.
She then turned north onto Yellowstone heading toward the Fred Meyer as did the Blazer. Ms.
Sampson then turned right on Cedar St., which is located a long block north of Pine, without
signaling. T pg. 184, In. 10 - pg. 185, ln. 23. The Blazer also turned right. TT pg. 186, ln. 1 pg. 187, ln. 1.
Ms. Sampson then called her husband, but was not able to reach him. She called again
while driving eastbound on Cedar and, after speaking to him, decided to drive to the police
station. T pg. 187, ln. 11-18. She turned right from Cedar onto Jefferson Ave, right again from
Jefferson onto Oak, and left onto Sherman where the police station is located. T pg. 188, ln. 422. Both Jefferson and Oak are main thoroughfares in Pocatello. The Blazer was between two to
four cars behind Ms. Sampson as she drove down Jefferson and Oak. The Blazer continued
down Oak Street and did not turn down Sherman. T pg. 189, ln. 15 - pg. 65, ln. 5.
Officer Sampson testified that his wife arrived at the police station and told him the
3

license plate number of the Blazer. T pg. 206, ln. 16. He testified that Ms. Eliasen's "name came
back" when he "r[an] that license plate." T pg. 220, ln. 18 - pg. 221, ln. 1.
After the state rested its case, Ms. Eliasen moved for a judgment of acquittal under I.C.R.
29. Defense counsel argued, inter alia, that the state had not shown multiple events. T pg. 230,
19-25. The court denied the motion stating that the "course of conduct" required by the statute
"can be as little as two acts" and that the jury would have to decide whether there was a single act
of following or whether Ms. Sampson stopping at Goodwill was a break between the first and
second episodes. T pg. 233, ln. 15-25.
Mr. Eliasen testified that he and Desiree work together selling real estate. Fridays are
very busy days for real estate professionals because they need to prepare for Saturday, when most
buyers want to look at houses. T pg. 237, ln. 10; pg. 240, ln. 15-24. A typical Friday includes
checking on properties listed on the Multiple Listing Service, making sure the flyer boxes at their
listings are full and ensuring that their listings look presentable for potential buyers. They also
try to locate For Sale By Owner properties to get them to list with them and check on homes in
foreclosure or pre-foreclosure. T pg. 241, ln. 2 - pg. 118, In. 1. On the Friday in question here,
September 26, 2008, he was not able to assist Desiree because he was teaching a class at the
Pocatello Police Department. T pg. 244, In. 7-22. Part of the plan for that Friday was for Desiree
to view a pre-foreclosure property at 1001 Willow Lane, about a block from Ms. Sampson's
house on Wy ldwood, and to inspect some of the properties they managed located south of Oak
Street. TT pg. 251, ln. 15 - pg. 252, ln. 20. She also had to go to Sign-A-Rama, which is at 215
E. Cedar Street, to pick up a custom sign. Thus, her business tasks for that day took her to the
area around Ms. Sampson's house and down to near the police station. In addition to her job-
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related tasks, Desiree also had to go to the bank to get cash and make their mortgage payment. T
pg. 245, ln. 2 - pg. 246, ln. 7-24.
Another real estate broker and former Pocatello Police patrol officer, Paul Romirell,
corroborated Mr. Eliasen's testimony about the daily tasks of a real estate professional. T pg.
278, ln. 1 - 23. He also testified that Yellowstone and Jefferson were main North-South
roadways and that Alameda, Cedar, Maple and Oak are all major East-West roads. T pg. 279, ln.
15 - pg. 280, ln. 13.
The jury found Ms. Eliasen guilty. R 270.
3. Sentencing
The magistrate court imposed judgment and placed Ms. Eliasen on 24 months of
probation. It imposed 20 days of jail to be served forthwith and ordered an additional 20 days to
be served on the labor detail. He also ordered that Ms. Eliasen pay a fine, obtain a psychological
evaluation and to follow all recommendations of the evaluator. R 278-279.
A timely Notice of Appeal was filed. R 312. However, no action was taken on the
appeal.
4. The District Court Appeal
On August 1, 2012, an Amended Notice of Appeal was filed. That pleading erroneously
omitted noting that Ms. Eliasen continued to seek review of the Judgment of Conviction and
Sentence. R 11. Current appellate counsel appeared and on February 4, 2013, a Second
Amended Notice of Appeal correcting that error was filed. R 15; 22-24.
On appeal, Ms. Eliasen argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove that she
engaged in a "course of conduct," defined in the statute as "repeated acts of nonconsensual
5

contact." LC.§ 19-7906(2)(a). The district court found there was sufficient evidence of more
than one act of nonconsentual contact.
In this case, Appellant appeared outside of the victim's home before any
following even occurred. Once following did begin, the victim reached Goodwill,
a destination, and Appellant maintained surveillance on the victim at that
destination before following the victim a second time after the victim left
Goodwill. These facts demonstrate that there is substantial competent evidence to
find that Appellant engaged in repeated acts of nonconsensual contact with the
victim.
R 76.
The district court upheld the jury verdict and affirmed the judgment. R 88. A timely
Notice of Appeal was filed. R 90.

III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the state present sufficient evidence to prove that Ms. Eliasen engaged in a "course of
conduct" that seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed the victim?
IV. ARGUMENT

The State Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence to Prove There Was Course of Conduct That
Seriously Alarmed, Annoyed or Harassed the Victim.
A. Standard of Review

On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, this Court
reviews the decision of the district court directly. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670,672, 183
P.3d 758, 760 (2008).
The Due Process Clauses of the United States and State Constitutions preclude conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which a defendant is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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In short, Winship presupposes as an essential of the due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a
criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof-defined as evidence necessary to
convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every
element of the offense.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). In the case where a properly instructed jury has
convicted even though no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
that conviction cannot constitutionally stand. Jackson, 443 U.S., pg. 318.
While Ms. Eliasen's attorneys made an I.C.R. 29 motion, a criminal defendant need not
even move for a judgment of acquittal in order to preserve for appeal the issue of whether there
was sufficient evidence before the jury to support a guilty verdict. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho
873, 877, 908 P.2d 566,570 (1995); State v. Ashley, 126 Idaho 694, 696, 889 P.2d 723, 725 (Ct.
App. 1994). Thus, this issue may be raised upon appeal.
Upon appellate review, this Court must determine, based upon its independent
consideration of the evidence, whether there was substantial and competent evidence to support
the verdict. State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 501, 36 P.3d 1287, 1289 (Ct. App. 2001). Put in
constitutional terms: "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S., pg. 319. This is one of
those rare cases where the state obtained a conviction even though it failed to meet its
constitutional burden.

B. There Was Insufficient Evidence to Show a Course of Conduct
Here the state failed to show there was a course of conduct as required by statute.
Therefore, this Court should vacate the conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal.
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The state charged Ms. Eliasen with that portion of the statute which provides that "[a]
person commits the crime of stalking in the second degree if the person knowingly and
maliciously ... [e]ngages in a course of conduct that seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the
victim and is such as would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress." R 160.
The statute defines the term "course of conduct" to mean "repeated acts of nonconsensual
contact." I.C. § 19-7906(2)(a) (emphasis added) Examples of"[n]onconsensual contact" under
section 2(c) includes appearing at the residence of the victim, as well as "(f]ollowing the victim
or maintaining surveillance [. ]"
Here, the evidence was insufficient because there was only a single occurrence of nonconsensual contact between Ms. Eliasen and Ms. Sampson. And a single occurrence of
nonconsensual contact cannot constitute a "course of conduct" under LC. § 19-7906(1 )(a).
While there is no appellate opinion addressing this issue, the principles of statutory interpretation
require that conclusion. As the Supreme Court has said,
the objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative
body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language
of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in
the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole,
and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute
so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language
is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given
effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory construction.

State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67, 264 P.3d 970, 973-74 (2011); see, State v. Harvey, 142
Idaho 727, 730, 132 P.3d 1255, 1258 (Ct. App. 2006) (constructions of a statute which leads to
an absurd result are disfavored); see also State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788,
792 (2008) ("[T]he rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor
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of defendants.").
While the plain language of the statute requires "repeated acts" of nonconsensual contact
all the evidence shows, even when taken in the light most favorable to the state, is that Ms.
Eliasen drove to Wyldwood Lane and followed Ms. Sampson until Ms. Sampson turned off of
Oak Street onto Sherman Street, stopping only for traffic signals and when Ms. Sampson paused
at the Goodwill. That is a single instance of nonconsensual contact.
The district court, without citation to supporting authority,1 was of the "view that a
change in the nature of the conduct that a defendant engages in creates a sufficient break in the
events to demonstrate a course of conduct through repeated acts on nonconsensual contact with a
victim." R 76. And, it found that the "facts of this case amount to not only two instances of
prohibited conduct [as found by the magistrate judge], but instead four instances of prohibited
conduct(:]"
First, Appellant appeared at the victim's residence before ever following the
victim. Second, Appellant followed the victim to Goodwill. Third, Appellant

The district court did cite to two Washington State cases, both interpreting the
Washington State stalking statute. Revised Code of Washington§ 9A.46.110(1)(a) prohibits
"intentionally and repeatedly harassing or repeatedly following another person." R 76-77. The
Washington Supreme Court has written in this regard, "As we have observed, 'repeatedly' is
defined as 'on two or more separate occasions,' meaning district, individual, noncontinuance
occurrences or incidents." State v. Kintz, 238 P.3d 470,477 (Wash. 2010). By contrast, the
Idaho statute does not define "repeated" as used in subsection 2(a) of section 18-7906, nor does
the Washington statute use the term "nonconsensual contact," so the persuasive effect of Kintz is
nil. However, it may be worth observing that Ms. Eliasen did not repeatedly engage in acts of
nonconsentual conduct under Kintz 's definition of "repeatedly," as there was only one contact.
Accord, City o/Seattle v. Meah, 297 P.3d 69, 72 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (Evidence of "separate
occasions" insufficient where defendant attempted to talk to complaining witness on bus,
continued when he trailed her off the bus and up the street and ended when a third party
intervened. "Because no reasonable jury could find that Meah's conduct constituted more than a
single, continuous episode of following, the evidence introduced at Meah' s trial was insufficient
to support Meah's stalking conviction based on two or more separate occasions of following.")
1
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conducted surveillance on the victim while the victim conducted her business at
Goodwill. And fourth, Appellant followed the victim from the Goodwill store
nearly the entire way to the police station.
R 84-85. However, this disagreement between the magistrate and the district judge is of no
importance because whether there were two or four instances of prohibited conduct there was
only one instance of nonconsensual conduct.
First, it is important to note that the statute does not require multiple instances of
prohibited conduct. It requires "repeated acts of nonconsensual contact." LC.§ 18-7906(2)(a).
Examples of "nonconsensual contact" include appearing at the victim's residence, following the
victim and maintaining surveillance. LC. § 18-7906(2)(c)(i) and (iii). There is only one act of
"nonconsensual contact" here even if, as the district court concluded, there was prohibited
conduct by waiting at Wyldwood Lane, following to Goodwill, waiting there and then continuing
the following. The nonconsensual contact between Ms. Eliasen and Ms. Sampson began at
Wyldwood Lane and did not end until Ms. Sampson turned off Oak Street onto Sherman Street.
While the type of prohibited contact changed during the course of the nonconsensual contact,
there was still only one contact. The district court's use of alchemy to convert a change in the
nature of the continuing contact into a separate instance of contact is contrary to the plain
language of the statute. Moreover, the district court's interpretation of the statute would lead to
the absurd result where the behavior of the complaining witness determines whether there is a
single occurrence of contact or multiple instances (and thus criminal liability) simply by pausing
while being followed.
The natural reading of the statute is that there can only be a new act of "nonconsensual
contact" when there is some break in the original "nonconsensual contact." Without such a
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break, there cannot be "repeated acts of nonconsensual contact," as required by the statute. Here,
there was no break in the contact. Desiree drove to Wyldwood Street, began the contact when
she followed Ms. Sampson to Goodwill, paused when Ms. Sampson shortly paused and then
continued following when Ms. Sampson resumed, all without breaking off the nonconsensual
contact at anytime. According to Ms. Sampson, there was no time that Desiree left the
immediate area nor did Desiree break off contact from the time Ms. Sampson left her home on
Wyldwood until they parted ways when Ms. Sampson turned off Oak Street onto Sherman. Only
one instance of nonconsentual contact occurred.
This Court must vacate the conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal because this
Court cannot determine, based upon its independent consideration of the evidence, that there was
substantial and competent evidence to support the verdict. State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho at 501, 36
P.3d at 1289. The state's evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, is insufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
at 316.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Desiree Eliasen asks this Court to vacate the judgment of
conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal.

~r

Respectfully submitted thi~ day of January, 2014.

~~.

~

Dennis Benjamin
:::;c--:
Attorney for Desiree Eliasen
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